Recently, a new public-key cryptosystem constructed on number elds is presented. The prominent theoretical property of the public-key cryptosystem is a quadratic decryption bit complexity of the public key, which consists of only simple fast arithmetical operations. We call the cryptosystem NICE (New Ideal Coset Encryption). In this paper, we consider practical aspects of the NICE cryptosystem. Our implementation in software shows that the decryption time of NICE is comparably as fast as the encryption time of the RSA cryptosystem with e = 2 16 + 1. To show if existing smart cards can be used, we implemented the NICE cryptosystem using a smart card designed for the RSA cryptosystem. Our result shows that the decryption time of NICE is comparably as fast as the decryption time of RSA cryptosystem but not so fast as in software implementation. We discuss the reasons for this and indicate requirements for smartcard designers to achieve fast implementation on smartcards.
1 Why NICE?
Plenty of public-key cryptosystem not relying only on the RSA cryptosystem have been proposed. They are stemming from deep number theory (hyper-and superelliptic curves) to geometry and combinatorics (LLL-based systems). One major advantage of RSA is its simplicity: it can be easily implemented, one only needs a moderate background in mathematics to understand it. Moreover, RSA is quite fast -there exist public key cryptosystems which are much faster, but the combination of simplicity, speed and con dence in its security makes it the most practical cryptosystem. Until now, only one other system may be considered as equally interesting: ElGamal type systems on elliptic curves. Elliptic curves are somewhat more complicated, and the best known algorithms to break elliptic curve cryptosystems are much slower, in the order of exponential complexity. So, both speed and security are worth being paid by the higher mathematical complexity.
But: both systems have one drawback in common: the decryption/signing time is of cubic complexity in the bit length of the public key for both systems because these steps consist of modular multiplication(s). This becomes even more important when thinking of smart cards. The smart card is considered to be the personal security computing device of tomorrow. It contains all personal secret information, especially the private keys for public key systems like decryption and signing. The complexity of PC operating systems is too high to be reliably secure; every relevant security operation should be e ected by the smart card. Non-relevant operations like public key encryption and signature veri cation could be done by the PC. Operations which cannot be transferred to the PC at all due to security reasons are decryption and signing. Considering RSA, the task which has to be e ected by a low power computing device is precisely the most complex task. Moreover, we can expect that the key length of the public key will increase with the progress of hardware technology. In addition, there are no guarantees that new sub-exponential attacks for the basic number theoretic problem will not be suddenly proposed. Therefore it would be better to have a more e cient public key cryptosystem.
As an alternative, we might use a new public-key cryptosystem constructed over number elds 23]. The cryptosystem has a theoretically fast decryption process such as a quadratic decryption complexity of bit-length of a public-key, which consists of only simple fast arithmetical operations. So even if the key length gets bigger in the future, there will be no great increase of the computational complexity. This becomes even more important when thinking of smart cards.
In this paper, we call the new cryptosystem NICE, (New Ideal Coset Encryption). We focus on the practical aspects of NICE cryptosystem. We implement the NICE cryptosystem over di erent architectures, namely software on a standard PC and on a smartcard designed for the RSA cryptosystem. Our implementation in software shows NICE is as fast as the encryption time of the RSA cryptosystem with e = 2 16 + 1. Implementation on a smartcard designed for the RSA cryptosystem is comparably as fast as the decryption time of the RSA cryptosystem but not so fast as in software implementation. We discuss the reasons for this and indicate requirements to achieve fast implementation on smartcards. This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we explain the details of the algorithms of the NICE cryptosystem. In section 3, we give several applications based on NICE cryptosystem. In section 4, we show timings of the implementation in software. In section 5, we discuss a smart card implementation and its problems.
The NICE cryptosystem
In this section, we present an overview of the NICE cryptosystem. Details can be found in 23]; some mathematical background can be found in appendix A.
The idea of NICE is roughly as follows: consider two nite abelian groups G and H which are related by a surjective map : G ! H. The representation of elements of G and the group operation algorithm of G are publicly known, as well as an element p of the kernel of . Assume that you know the group H (i.e. representation of group elements and group operation) and how to compute , but no one else does. The message space consists of uniquely chosen preimages m of elements M of H under . Now, a message m is encrypted by randomly multiplying an element p e of Ker onto it: the ciphertext is c = m p e . Decryption simply works as follows: compute the uniquely chosen preimage of m of M = (m p e ). This is a secure cryptosystem if the computation of the map cannot be deduced from the given information, namely the group G, the kernel element p and the way chosen to characterize the special preimages. There exist some constructions of this scheme using number theoretic problems, e.g. 22 ]. An overview can be found in 24].
The following implementation of this scheme is especially interesting (see the appendix for the de nitions): Generate two random primes p; q > 4 such that p 3 (mod 4) and let 1 = ?p. Let G = Cl( 1 ) be the ideal class group of the maximal order with discriminant 1 and H = Cl( q ) be the ideal class group of the nonmaximal order with conductor q. q will be public, whilst its factorization into 1 and q will be kept private. Concerning security aspects of this cryptosystem, we refer to 23]. Some arguments can be found in appendix B. Again, please note that this cryptosystem can easily be implemented using well-known techniques and existing smart cards. This will be shown in the next section.
Applications
In section 3, we will present NICE in the formulation of an encryption scheme. An immediate application is therefore session key distribution from a powerful server to a device which has a limited computing power or where time is important. An example for such a device is e.g. a mobile phone.
Another application of NICE is the use as an authentication scheme. The usual protocols (2-way and 3-way) can be adapted to use NICE as encryption component. Of course, it could be combined with RSA, where the modulus is the absolute value of the discriminant of the non-maximal order, i.e. q . In that case, the 3-way protocol can be realized in such a way that the client (= the low computing power device) only e ects the fast components of both algorithms.
As a last application, we propose an undeniable signature scheme. NICE itself cannot be used as a classical signature scheme; undeniable signature schemes have their own use e.g. in online transactions. A signature of this kind cannot be veri ed without the interaction of the signer. The standard example for its application is its use by a software development company: the distributed software is signed by means of an undeniable signature of the company to allow legal users to ensure themselves that they use unmodi ed software. Since interaction with the seller is needed to check the signature, illegal users either cannot check and risk to use some virus-infected software or will be traced by the software-seller as soon as they ask for interactive veri cation.
Details can be found in 5]. Again, the low computing power device only e ectuates the NICE decryption steps, so smart cards can be used for assuring the security of online transactions.
NICE running times in software
The prominent property of the proposed cryptosystem is the running time of the decryption. Most prominent cryptosystems require decryption time O((log 2 n) 3 ), where n is the size of the public key. The total running time of the decryption process of our cryptosystem is O((log 2 q ) 2 ) bit operations. In order to demonstrate the improved e ciency of our decryption, we implemented our scheme using the LiDIA library 3]. It should be emphasized here that our implementation was not optimized for cryptographic purposes | it is only intended to provide a comparison between RSA and NICE. The results are shown in table 1.
Observe that one can separate the fast exponentiation step of the encryption as a \precomputation" stage. Indeed, if we can securely store the values (p; b p ) r , then the actual encryption can be e ected very rapidly, since it requires only one ideal multiplication and one ideal reduction. Moreover, using well-known techniques for randomized encryption, we can even reduce the encryption time much more. Note that no square root technique like the Pollard-rho method or Shanks' algorithm are directly applicable to the ciphertext (c; b c ), because the encryption consists of (c; b c ) = (m; b m )(p; b p ) r where r is a random exponent and (m; b m ) is the secret plaintext. This means that we can use a very short random exponent r having e.g. about 80 bits.
It should be mentioned that the size of a message for our cryptosystem is signi cantly smaller than the size of a message for the RSA encryption (e.g. 256 bit vs. 768 bit, or 341 bit vs. 1024 bit). In connection with the very fast decryption time, an excellent purpose for our cryptosystem could be (symmetric) key distribution. In that setting, the short message length is not a real drawback. On the other hand, the message length is longer than for ElGamal encryption on \comparably" secure elliptic curves (e.g. 341 bit vs. 180 bit).
In Table 3 : Timings for the decryption of the new cryptosystem compared to RSA using a hardware simulator of Siemens 66CX80S at 4.915 MHz
The rst implementation was very ine cient; the straightforward algorithms used in the software comparison proved to be much slower on the smart card than the existing RSA on the card. This was surprising, but after a while this could be easily explained: the cryptographic coprocessor has been optimized for modular exponentiation, whereas NICE uses mostly divisions with remainder and comparisons. These operations are slow on the coprocessor, so we had to modify the decryption algorithm to speed it up in hardware. We describe here two signi cant changes:
The computation of the inverse of a modulo q (step 2 in the computation of ) using the extended Euclidean algorithm took (with q p 341 bit) about 9 seconds (!), whereas computing the inverse using Fermat's little theorem -by using fast exponentiation mod q -took less than 1 second. Note that the decryption time using this method is no longer of quadratic complexity.
In the reduction process the quotient in the division with remainder step is most of the time very small (say 10, see Appendix D); to e ect a division is this case is much more time consuming than subsequent subtractions. We replaced Table 4 : Detailed timings for di erent functions in the decryption of the new cryptosystem One major di erence between RSA and NICE is the number of variables needed during the computation of the decryption algorithm. In our implementation, we need to store 11 variables of length at most 2048 bit. Computations of the cryptographic coprocessor shorten these variables. Thus, we had to adjust the length of the variables after each important operation. This was done by moving the top nonzero bytes of the number to the xed address of the number and so "erasing" leading zero bytes. To do this, we used the cryptographic coprocessor. Now the exact timings showed that about 33 % of the running time is spent by the function left adjust, which e ects this correction. First tests in the software simulator showed that another memory management using dynamic addresses will indeed probably decrease the running time by about 30 %.
Note to the referee: we will try and include new tests with the Hardware simulator for this improvement in the nal version. This is ongoing work.
As one can see from table 4, another important time consuming operation is to move numbers into and out of the coprocessor. At this point, we would get a speedup of about 350 ms if we could leave the numbers in registers inside the coprocessor. It is clear that the currently used processor is not prepared for such operations, since it is optimized for RSA, thus operations with very few variables. At this point we ask the hardware community to present solutions to this problem.
Conclusion and acknowledgements
The NICE cryptosystem is fast and well suited for software implementation. To get an equally fast speedup compared to RSA on a smart card, we think that the underlying hardware must be developed adequately. Nevertheless, if this is done, we think that NICE can be a competitor to RSA whenever fast decryption is needed. 23] S. Paulus and T. Takagi, \A new public-key cryptosystem over the quadratic order with quadratic decryption time," to appear In the appendices, we use the mathematical terminology from number theory (ideals, reduced ideals, etc.) to rely on a more precise and exact formulation. We tried to keep the general presentation as easy as possible. The map from above is called ' q here.
A Quadratic Orders
We brie y explain the class group of a quadratic order. A more comprehensive and complete treatment may be found in 10].
Let 2 ZZ not a square such that 0; 1 (mod 4). We call a (quadratic) discriminant.
is called a fundamental discriminant if 1 (mod 4) and is square-free, or =4 2; 3 (mod 4) and is square-free. Every discriminant can be represented by 1 f 2 , where 1 is a fundamental discriminant and f is an integer, and we denote f = 1 f 2 . We consider only negative discriminants in this paper. A.1 The map Cl( q ) ! Cl ( 1 ) In the following, let f = f 2 1 < 0 a negative quadratic discriminant. Every step of this algorithm requires O((log q j q j) 2 bit operations, thus the complexity of this algorithm is quadratic.
We discuss the \inverse" map ' ?1 q . The map ' q : Cl( q ) ! Cl ( 1 ) is surjective and we have h( f ) = h( 1 ) (q ? ( 1 =q)), where ( 1 =q) is the Kronecker-symbol (See, for example, 10]). Denote by Ker(' q ) the kernel of the map ' q : Cl( q ) ! Cl( 1 ) which is a cyclic subgroup of Cl( q ) with order q ? ( 1 =q). So there is a (q ? ( 1 =q))-fold ambiguity for the inverse of the map ' q . We will distinguish a unique reduced ideal from these preimages using the size of the norm of an ideal.
The norm of any reduced ideal in Cl ( 1 ) is smaller than q j 1 j=3. By our assumption q j 1 j=3 < q all ideals in Cl( 1 ) are prime to the conductor q. Therefore for a reduced ideal A in Cl( 1 ) a = ?1 (A) = A \ O q is a primitive ideal in I q (q), and N(A) = N(a). If the primitive ideal a in I q (q) satis es N(a) < q j 1 j=4, then a is a reduced ideal. Consequently, if we restrict ourselves to ideals a in Cl( q ) such that N(a) < q j 1 j=4, then ' q (a) \ O q is reduced (in I q (q)) and so we can compute a distinguished inverse of the map ' q . Note that the cardinality of this set is smaller than that of Cl( 1 ). We denote by ' ?1 q this restricted inverse map and the practical algorithm to compute the map Inverse is as follows: This algorithm obviously requires only O((log( q j 1 j)) 2 ) bit operations.
B Security considerations
The security of our cryptosystem depends on the di culty of factoring the discriminant q . If the discriminant q can be factored, our proposed cryptosystem is completely broken. At rst, we consider the size of the secret parameters 1 and q to prevent breaking the cryptosystem by factoring q .
On the other hand, an attacker may somehow compute '(a) for some ideal a of O q .
We prove that to compute the map GoToMaxOrder is as intractable as factoring q .
In our cryptosystem, we make public an ideal p in Ker(' q ). We discuss that according to current knowledge the knowledge of such an ideal does not bring any advantage for factoring the discriminant.
Finally we argue that a chosen message attack as presented in 28] will not give us substantially more knowledge than previously known.
B.1 The size of the secret parameters
We discuss the size of the secret parameters 1 = ?p and q which prevents attacks by The number eld sieve is the fastest factoring algorithm, and the running time depends on the total bit length of the composite number j q j; it is of the order of L j q j 1=3; (64=9) 1=3 ]. Currently the fastest implementation for the number eld sieve factored a 130 digit RSA modulus 9]. If we choose q to be larger than 768 bits, the number eld sieve becomes infeasible. On the other side, the elliptic curve method depends on the size of the primes p or q and the expected running time is L r 1=2; 2 1=2 ], where r is p or q. The fastest implementation for the elliptic curve method found an 48 digit prime factor 12]. If we choose p and q to be larger than 256 bits, the elliptic curve method becomes infeasible. Therefore the 768 bit discriminant q with 256 bit p; q is secure for cryptographic purposes.
It is unknown whether there exists an L p 1=3; c]-type subexponential algorithm which nds the primes of a composite number with square prime factor faster than the generic number eld sieve.
B.2 GoToMaxOrder
Only the one who knows the conductor q can compute the map ' q and then recover any message ideal. If attackers somehow can compute the image ' q (a) of a speci c ideal a in Cl( q ), then the message ideal m will be recovered. However, we can prove that the discriminant q can be factored using few iterations of any algorithm which computes the image of ' q .
Theorem 1 Assume that there exists the algorithm AL which computes for the primitive ideal a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) 2 I q (q) a primitive ideal A = (A 1 ; A 2 ) 2 I 1 (q) such that A = (a) without knowing the conductor q. By using the algorithm AL as an oracle, the discriminant q = q 2 can be factored in polynomial time.
This theorem means that nobody can \switch" the primitive ideal (a; b) to the maximal order without the knowledge of the conductor q. Additionally, if we apply this to the reduced ideals in Cl( q ) with norm smaller than q j 1 j=4, we can prove that to compute GoToMaxOrder is as intractable as factoring q .
B.3 Knowledge of p
We will argue that the knowledge of p does not substantially help to factor q . For simplicity, we assume p is the generator of the group Ker(' q ).
A non-trivial ambiguous ideal is an ideal f in Cl( q ) such that f 2 1 and f 6 1. If a non-trivial ambiguous ideal in the order O q is known, we can factor the discriminant q 27]. For the discriminant q of our cryptosystem, there are only 1 or 3 nontrivial ambiguous ideals in Cl( q ). Moreover, the non-trivial ambiguous ideals lie in the group Ker(' q ). It is unknown that other ideals in Ker(' q ) except the ambiguous ideals can be used for factoring the discriminant q . So, the probability that p r for a random r will be a non-trivial ambiguous ideal is negligible.
In our cryptosystem, we publish the ideal p. A possible attack to nd a non-trivial ambiguous ideal for a given p is to compute the order of p in the group Cl( q ).
However, if we can compute the order of the ideal p, then the conductor q is known. So, such an algorithm is at least as hard as factoring the discriminant q . This shows that with the currently known algorithms, the knowledge of p does with high probability not help in factoring q .
B.4 Chosen message attack
Let G 1 ; G 2 be nite abelian groups and consider a surjective homomorphism ' : G 1 ! G 2 . If two elements g; h in G 1 satisfy '(g) = '(h), then we call them to be in the same coset. Our cryptosystem is constructed using the surjective homomorphism Similarly, Shamir proposed an RSA-type public-key cryptosystem using the homomorphism ' S : (ZZ=nZZ) ! (ZZ=pZZ) , where n = pq and p; q are primes 28]. In the key generation, e; d are generated by the relation ed 1 (mod p ? 1). The message M must be smaller than p. For the encryption we compute C M e (mod n), and the message can be recovered by M C d (mod p). For an element a 2 (ZZ=nZZ) , all elements of the coset of a for the map ' S are represented by fa; a + p; a + 2p; : : : ; a + (q ? 1)pg. Therefore, if we know two elements a 1 ; a 2 in the same coset, we can factor the modulus n by computing GCD(a 1 ? a 2 ; n) = p. This is equivalent to the fact that n can be factored if we know an element in the kernel of ' S .
Using this Gilbert et al. proposed the following attack against this cryptosystem 14]. Let M 0 be a message larger than p, and C be the ciphertext corresponding to M 0 . If an attacker can know the regular plaintext corresponding to C, say M, then the modulus n can be factored by computing GCD(M ? M 0 ; n). We call this attack the chosen message attack. Note that this chosen message can be achieved because ZZ=nZZ is not only a group but also a ring.
Consider the chosen message attack against our proposed cryptosystem. Our cryptosystem has already made public an element of Ker(' S ). Let m 0 be the message ideal such that N(m 0 ) > p, and c = Red q (m 0 p r ) be the corresponding ciphertext. If m is the regular message ideal which is in the same coset of m 0 and N(m) < p, then we have m = Red q m 0 p s for some integer s. In other words, a chosen message attack gives us only another element in the coset of m. Therefore, the chosen message attack is reduced to the problem in section B.3, whether we can factor the discriminant q by the knowledge of an element in Ker(' q ).
C Embedding strategy
To embed a message, we have to assure that the message ideal will be di erent from the cipher ideal, i.e. that the message ideal does not belong to the image of the map ' ?1 q . This is done by requiring that the message ideal has norm at least greater than q j 1 j=3 < 2 k+1 . Remember that for an ideal given by (a; b) we know that (a; b) is reduced in O q if a < q j q j=2. Let k q be the bit length of j q j and m the (hash value of a) message of length n. (Typically n = 128 and k q = 1024).
We set x to be the concatenation of m and a sequence of k q =2 ? 3 ? n zeroes, i.e. x = mjj0 kq=2?3?n . We determine the smallest prime l greater than x which ful lls ( q =l) = 1. This can be done e ectively using a few trials of primality tests and Jacobi symbol computations. With very high probability we will nd such a l with l ? x < 2 kq=2?3?n . Observe that by this embedding method, every message will be embedded uniquely, since the \message bits" will never be changed. 
